China’s economic slowdown presents real risks for Africa, from weaker commodity demand to less infrastructure financing. But it is also changing the balance of power around the continent — giving African economies more options as the US, Gulf states and other powers compete for resources, markets and strategic infrastructure.
For two decades, China’s rise and Africa’s economic transformation have been closely connected.
China bought African oil, copper, cobalt and iron ore. Chinese banks financed railways, ports and power plants. Chinese companies built infrastructure and supplied everything from telecom equipment to industrial machinery.
That relationship remains enormous. China-Africa trade reached a record $348 billion in 2025, confirming Beijing’s position as the continent’s largest bilateral trading partner.
But the Chinese economy behind that relationship is changing.
Weak property investment, softer domestic demand and slower growth are pushing Beijing and Chinese companies towards a more selective approach abroad.
For Africa, that creates both risk and opportunity.
The era of Chinese mega-loans is fading
The clearest change is infrastructure finance.
Between 2000 and 2024, Chinese lenders committed around $181 billion to African governments and regional institutions.
At the peak in 2016, annual lending reached almost $29 billion. By 2024, it had fallen to roughly $2.1 billion.
China is not abandoning Africa. Instead, the model is changing.
Large sovereign loans are increasingly giving way to smaller projects, private investment and deals with clearer commercial returns.
That leaves African governments with a challenge. The continent still needs enormous investment in electricity, railways, ports and digital infrastructure, but Beijing is less willing to write the large cheques that characterised the early Belt and Road era.
Commodity exporters face the biggest risk
China’s slowdown also matters because Africa remains a major supplier of Chinese industry.
Angola exports oil. Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo depend heavily on copper and cobalt. Guinea supplies bauxite and iron ore, while South Africa exports a broad range of minerals.
When Chinese investment and construction slow, demand for some of these commodities can weaken.
The IMF has previously estimated that a one-percentage-point decline in Chinese growth could reduce sub-Saharan African growth by around 0.25 percentage points within a year, with an even larger impact on some commodity exporters.
That is the immediate danger.
But China’s economic problems could also produce a very different effect.
Chinese factories need new markets
China has built one of the world’s largest manufacturing systems.
Its challenge is increasingly finding enough customers for everything it can produce.
Weak domestic demand and growing trade barriers in the US and Europe are pushing Chinese companies to look towards emerging markets.
Africa offers something particularly attractive: resources, young consumers and potential locations for manufacturing.
That could gradually change the economic relationship.
For years, the basic model was simple:
Africa exported commodities. China exported manufactured goods.
The next phase should be different.
Chinese companies could increasingly manufacture inside Africa — producing EVs, batteries, solar equipment, electronics, machinery and consumer goods closer to African customers and raw materials.
For African governments, attracting that production should become a priority.
Africa can demand more
The same principle applies to critical minerals.
Africa possesses many of the resources needed for electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy, defence technology and advanced electronics.
China wants them.
But increasingly, so does everyone else.
The United States wants supply chains that are less dependent on China. Europe needs materials for its energy transition. Gulf investors are expanding into African mining, energy and logistics. India, Japan and South Korea also want more secure access to strategic resources.
That gives Africa leverage.
Instead of asking only who will finance the next mine, governments can increasingly ask:
How much of the value chain will you build here?
Copper can be refined and turned into cables. Lithium can move into processing and battery materials. Bauxite can become alumina and eventually aluminium.
The objective should be to export fewer raw materials and more valuable products.
America sees an opening
China’s changing position is also encouraging greater US engagement.
The Lobito Corridor is perhaps the clearest example.
The US-backed project connecting Angola with the mineral regions of the DRC and Zambia is designed to improve access to Central Africa’s critical-mineral belt and provide an Atlantic export route.
But Lobito represents something larger than a railway.
Washington increasingly sees African minerals, energy, ports, digital infrastructure and supply chains as strategic assets.
That makes Africa more important to US economic security — and potentially unlocks a different class of investment.
Then there is the Gulf
Africa’s choices are also expanding beyond Washington and Beijing.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing heavily in African ports, logistics, mining, agriculture, renewable energy and increasingly digital infrastructure.
This creates a much more competitive landscape.
China needs markets and resources.
America needs secure supply chains.
Europe needs transition minerals.
The Gulf needs investment opportunities and strategic assets.
And Africa sits in the middle.
The opportunity is Africa’s to capture
China is not leaving Africa.
Its relationship with the continent is simply evolving from one dominated by infrastructure lending and commodity purchases towards investment, manufacturing, technology and competition for markets.
That transition carries risks.
Weaker Chinese demand could hurt African commodity exporters. Less Chinese lending could make infrastructure harder to finance. Cheap Chinese industrial exports could also make it difficult for African manufacturers to compete.
But the alternative scenario is far more interesting.
Chinese companies move production into Africa. American and Gulf investors compete for strategic projects. African governments demand local processing and manufacturing. New energy and transport corridors support industrial development.
For the first time in years, Africa may have several major powers competing for what it has.
The question is no longer whether China or America wins.
It is whether Africa uses that competition to capture more of the value for itself.
