Africa commodity trade: the new global centre

Africa commodity trade moves to the centre

Africa commodity trade is expanding in both volume and strategic weight. The 2026 African Trade Report by Afreximbank estimates that Africa’s merchandise trade reached about US$1.5 trillion in 2025, up 6.1% year on year. Intra-African trade stood at roughly US$213.8 billion over the same period. World Trade Organization figures show that Africa’s merchandise exports rose 14% year on year in the first quarter of 2026 — the second-fastest regional growth after Asia. Imports increased 15% over the same period.

This growth sits on a narrow base. UN Trade and Development analysis for 2025 indicates that primary goods still account for 76.7% of African merchandise exports. Fuels alone represent 29.5% of that total. The result is a continent that remains highly exposed to price swings, yet holds strategic weight wherever supply is tight and the energy transition depends on African minerals.

China remains Africa’s largest single trading partner. Chinese customs and policy data indicate that China–Africa trade reached about US$295.6 billion in 2024, up roughly 25-fold from US$10.6 billion in 2000. Broader estimates put the figure closer to US$348 billion in 2025, supported by Beijing’s extension of zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries from May 2026. IMF-referenced analysis adds that non-oil trade between Gulf Cooperation Council economies and Africa has now exceeded US$100 billion, driven mainly by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The structural question has changed. The issue is no longer whether the world needs African resources. It is whether African states and firms can turn external competition into industry, processing, logistics and employment. The goal is control over trade terms — not dependence on them.

Context: how Africa became the system’s missing centre

The past two decades embedded Africa into a China-centred commodity system. China’s industrial expansion drove demand for African oil, copper, iron ore and agricultural goods. Chinese firms financed and built mine-linked infrastructure across Central and Southern Africa. Congressional research for 2025 shows that Africa supplied 99.9% of China’s cobalt ore imports, 91% of chromium ores and 86% of natural graphite.

Africa’s own export structures shifted less than policymakers hoped. UNCTAD trade updates note that Africa’s export growth has often been led by higher shipments of gold, copper, fertilisers and ores. Ghana’s 2025 trade data, published by the Ghana Statistical Service, show that gold, cocoa products and mineral fuels made up 85.9% of exports. Gold alone accounted for nearly 63% of the country’s export earnings. Across the continent, Afreximbank data confirm that primary goods still dominate the US$1.5 trillion trade total recorded in 2025.

Three structural shifts are now bringing Africa to the centre of the commodity system. First, the global energy transition has turned Africa’s critical minerals into a strategic priority. Research by S&P Global indicates that Africa already supplies about 76% of mined cobalt and 41% of bauxite. The continent is on track to provide around 60% of global lithium and 40% of graphite by 2030. The International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook notes that African governments are actively seeking to leverage this position through local processing and transparent supply chains.

Second, Gulf economies have widened their focus from oil exports to Africa to broader trade and investment. IMF-linked analysis shows that non-oil GCC–Africa trade has more than doubled in recent years to exceed US$100 billion. Gulf capital is now present in African ports, warehouses and agribusiness platforms, often alongside Western and Asian players.

Third, Asia beyond China — especially India — is emerging as a more assertive buyer of African energy and minerals. India’s industrial growth and supply-security strategy are driving renewed interest in African coal, oil, gas and critical minerals. Brazil adds another dimension. It competes with African producers in iron ore, oil and agriculture, yet offers potential partnerships in tropical agriculture, mining technology and South–South trade.

Africa has shifted from being a price taker in commodity markets to being a system maker in critical supply chains — and institutional investors are beginning to price that shift into their allocations.

The data: corridors, trade flows and concentration

Trade, infrastructure and corporate data point to a continent that is both more connected and more concentrated than many global investors assume.

Afreximbank’s 2026 African Trade Report records merchandise trade at about US$1.5 trillion in 2025, with intra-African trade at roughly US$213.8 billion after a 5.5% annual increase. WTO figures for the first quarter of 2026 add that Africa’s exports rose 14% and imports 15% year on year. Growth was driven by higher shipments of gold, copper, fertilisers and ores, alongside stronger demand for vehicles, machinery and ships.

China–Africa bilateral flows continue to dominate. Chinese ministries report that trade with African countries reached around 1.41 trillion yuan — approximately US$196.6 billion — in the first half of 2026 alone. Capital goods and intermediate products made up nearly three quarters of Chinese exports to Africa over that period.

Commodity concentration is even more striking. Congressional research for 2025 notes that Africa provided 99.9% and 91% of China’s global imports of cobalt and chromium ores respectively, and 86% of natural graphite. S&P Global estimates that exploration budgets for Africa rose 11% to about US$1.44 billion in 2025, even as global exploration spending fell for a third consecutive year. That increase is concentrated in copper, gold, iron ore and battery minerals.

Transport corridors are reshaping optionality. The Lobito Corridor, linking Angola’s Atlantic port to Zambia’s Copperbelt and the Democratic Republic of Congo, is emerging as a flagship route for critical minerals. African Finance Corporation closed a US$753 million financing package in July 2026 to rehabilitate and operate a 1,300-kilometre brownfield rail line from Angola to the DRC. Concession deals have been signed with both Angola and Zambia. A planned 515-kilometre rail segment connecting into the Copperbelt targets over US$5 billion in capital expenditure from 2026 onward. The broader Lobito programme covers around 1,700 kilometres of rail and is expected to cost up to US$6 billion by 2030, with a planned freight capacity of about 4.6 million tonnes per year.

On the eastern side, the Tanzania–Zambia Railway Authority line — known as TAZARA — is entering an intensive revival phase. Tanzania’s Ministry of Transport confirms that the 1,860-kilometre railway is being modernised under a roughly US$1.4 billion programme backed by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. The package covers track rehabilitation, rolling stock upgrades worth about US$400 million, and new signalling systems under a long-term concession running towards 2050.

Together, Lobito and TAZARA aim to give Copperbelt minerals flexible access to both Atlantic and Indian Ocean gateways. For producers, the strategic goal is route competition — not a binary geopolitical choice.

Corporate structure in Africa commodity trade remains tight. A handful of global trading houses and integrated regional operators — including Olam Agri, ETG and the major grain merchants — dominate cross-border flows in grains, oilseeds and soft commodities. Moroccan fertiliser group OCP controls roughly two-thirds of global phosphate rock reserves. Meanwhile, Africa still imports close to 90% of its mineral fertiliser needs, according to industry data.

Stakeholders: winners, exposure and the competition for value

The convergence of Gulf capital, Asian demand and Brazilian competition around Africa commodity trade is creating distinct winners and exposures across governments, companies and investors.

For African governments, the immediate gains are higher trade volumes, new financing sources and expanded infrastructure. Zambia and the DRC stand to benefit directly from Lobito and TAZARA. Both corridors could lower transport times and costs for copper and cobalt exports while giving producing nations bargaining power between Atlantic and Indian Ocean routes. Angola gains from its role as Lobito’s anchor. AFC’s US$753 million brownfield financing and planned new builds in Zambia strengthen its position as a regional logistics hub.

Resource-rich states also face concentrated exposure. The DRC’s role as the leading supplier of cobalt and a major copper producer ties its fortunes tightly to global battery and grid investment cycles. Ghana’s reliance on gold, cocoa and mineral fuels for nearly 86% of export earnings in 2025 — as per Ghana Statistical Service data — shows how single-sector shocks can move national trade balances.

Corporate stakeholders include global trading houses, African integrated operators and Gulf-based platforms. ETG, Olam Agri and the major grain merchants control dense farm-gate networks, storage and logistics assets. These allow them to capture a large share of origin-level margins. Fertiliser suppliers such as OCP, Yara and Dangote Group shape both input prices and yield outcomes for African farmers, with the continent still importing around 90% of mineral fertiliser.

Gulf investors are expanding through ports, free zones and agrifood investments. Non-oil trade between Gulf countries and Africa now exceeds US$100 billion, led by UAE and Saudi flows that span food imports, metals, fertiliser and logistics assets. This capital can accelerate infrastructure builds and processing plants, but it also embeds African commodity chains within multi-regional corporate structures.

Asian stakeholders extend well beyond China. India, Japan and South Korea are increasing their presence in African critical minerals and energy. South Korea’s US$1 billion copper-linked arrangements with Glencore, reported in 2026, highlight how Asian buyers now tie financing and offtake to specific African operations.

Western governments and firms are re-entering the competition. The Lobito Corridor sits within the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the EU’s Global Gateway. This signals Western intent to create mineral routes less dependent on China-linked logistics. The exposed parties are those whose business models assume a passive Africa — a continent supplying commodities on fixed terms rather than negotiating routes, processing and partnerships. That assumption is now outdated.

The real strategic asset in Africa is not just the mine or the port; it is the corridor that connects them and the information that flows along it — a point increasingly reflected in how corridor financiers structure their returns.

What does the outlook mean for investors in Africa commodity trade?

The next decade will determine whether Africa can convert its central position in commodity markets into broader industrial and trading power.

Several signals point in a positive direction. Exploration budgets for Africa rose 11% to around US$1.44 billion in 2025, even as global exploration spending fell, per S&P Global data. That increase is concentrated in copper, gold, iron ore and battery minerals. Zambia is carrying multiple US$1–2 billion copper projects simultaneously. Guinea’s Simandou iron ore development is proceeding alongside large gold and lithium builds elsewhere on the continent.

New corridors are likely to reach key milestones by 2030. Lobito’s planned capacity of 4.6 million tonnes per year and a target to move 5 million tonnes of cargo by 2030 — as stated in project documentation — suggest meaningful throughput for Copperbelt metals. TAZARA’s modernisation programme, covering track upgrades and rolling stock worth about US$1.4 billion, aims to strengthen flows between Tanzania’s ports and inland producers.

Policy frameworks are also evolving. The African Continental Free Trade Area’s projection that intra-African trade could reach around US$250 billion in 2026 indicates a deliberate push to internalise more value within the continent. The IEA notes that African governments are seeking to embed local processing, disclosure standards and bilateral cooperation into critical mineral supply chains.

Three conditions will shape the trajectory. First, competition among corridors must translate into lower costs and more predictable service for producers. If Lobito and TAZARA deliver reliable access to both oceans, Copperbelt economies gain real leverage in offtake negotiations. Second, Africa must expand processing capacity rather than simply raising raw-material output. Gulf and Western investors are starting to back fertiliser plants, refineries and smelters; African governments need clear industrial strategies to ensure these assets fit national priorities. Third, data and regulation will matter as much as physical infrastructure. African regulators who can harness real-time information on flows, prices and contracts will be better placed to capture rents and manage risk.

For institutional investors, three practical themes stand out. Corridor-linked assets in rail, ports and storage will remain central to Africa commodity trade and could offer stable cash flows once construction is complete. Midstream processing in fertilisers, metals and soft commodities offers scope for equity and debt exposure, especially where local demand and export routes align. Data-rich platforms that connect farm-gate, mine-gate and logistics nodes are emerging as powerful enablers of price discovery and risk management.

Africa is now a geographic and strategic centre of the new commodity order — and over the next decade, investors should watch whether rising processing capacity, corridor completion and AfCFTA implementation allow it to become a trading powerhouse on its own terms.

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